Compliance and RegTech Solutions

MiCA KYC in 2026: what the term really means, who must comply, customer due diligence, the crypto Travel Rule and the compliance software it takes.

A practical MiCA compliance checklist for CASPs and token issuers: CASP authorisation, KYC AML, Travel Rule, proof of reserves, market abuse, token white papers and DORA, mapped to EU deadlines.

What compliance certifications does a FinTech product need? The required certifications depend on your product type, target market and data handling practices. At minimum, most FinTech products need SOC 2 Type II for data security, PCI DSS if handling payment card data and GDPR compliance for EU users. PCI DSS compliance checklist PCI DSS applies […]

Programmable compliance moves regulatory rules from manual review into smart contract code: identity-gated transfers, sanctions screening at the token level and automated issuer controls. A guide to what MiCA and the GENIUS Act now require, what can be encoded on-chain and what cannot.

MiCA vs MiFID II explained: where MiCA stops and securities law starts, when a token is a financial instrument, the gray zones and how to build when classification is pending.

DORA compliance software architecture covering article 30 contract minimums, exit strategy design, audit access, resilience testing and requirements traceability borrowed from aerospace engineering.

A dated EU AI Act compliance timeline and applicability map after Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, covering what changed in Article 113, Article 6 and Article 50 and why EUR-Lex, the Commission's AI Act tool and the most-cited third-party tracker still show the pre-amendment rules.

How to classify an AI system as high-risk under Article 6 and Annex III of the EU AI Act after the Digital Omnibus, with the new 1a to 1c carve-outs, a decision tree and worked examples.

MiCA custody requirements mapped provision by provision: Article 70's safekeeping baseline for every CASP, Article 75's nine-paragraph custody rulebook, the three-limb segregation test, the liability cap at market value at time of loss and the evidence a CASP should have ready for each obligation.

ESMA's 8 July 2026 Common Supervisory Action on custody, the six focus areas ESMA itself named, the DORA read-across, attributed commentary from Latham & Watkins and the MiCA Crypto Alliance and the engineering evidence a custody-authorized CASP should have ready, mapped to MiCA Article 75 and DORA obligations.

Verification of Payee is two jobs in one build, and the scheme treats them very differently. The requesting side is a specified round trip with a five second envelope and a discard rule. The responding side is a specified message shape wrapped around a decision the scheme declines to make, in a guidance document that says it is not part of the Rulebook and that the responder is free to ignore. This walks the message lifecycle position by position, states each one twice and closes each one on the contract both sides owe.

Article 5d did not ban sanctions screening on the instant rail. It moved the object of the screening from the transaction to the customer base, prohibited one specific check in one specific window between two specific parties and carved out three categories expressly. This walks the pre-2025 screening stack component by component and states, for each one, what replaces it and which control it was carrying.

An EMI or PI CTO has to prove on any business day that customer balances in the ledger equal the safeguarding accounts. No EU instrument in force names how often that comparison runs. This walks the invariants that do exist, the way each one breaks and the control that catches the break, ordered by how fast the control fires.

PSD3 and PSR compliance is an offset from an unset anchor, not a calendar date. The 21 and 27 month tiers, sourced from the Council's April 2026 compromise texts, and what a build has to have ready before either clock starts.

The EU Cyber Resilience Act's Article 14 sets up two separate reporting duties, not one sequence: an actively exploited vulnerability and a severe incident share the same 24-hour and 72-hour stages but diverge at the final report deadline. Filing there does not satisfy the separate duty to inform affected users.

A company that is at once a CRA manufacturer, a NIS2 essential or important entity and a DORA financial entity keeps three separate reporting duties on three separate filings, even where two of them reach the same national CSIRT. The CRA's Single Reporting Platform consolidates filings within the CRA itself and does not fold NIS2 or DORA into that filing.

The Cyber Resilience Act never defines severe as a standalone term. The threshold sits in Article 14(5), narrowing the general incident definition to sensitive or important data or functions, or to malicious code, while Article 3(42) sets a separate evidentiary bar for actively exploited that a high severity score alone does not meet.

Article 30 of the EU Data Act splits a switching duty by capability, not by service-model label, and Article 2(37) defines functional equivalence in law while no published standard operationalises it into a threshold. This article works through the exemption gate, the export inventory beyond raw data and the escrow-and-rebuild record that stands in for the missing standard, including the correction most coverage misses: 12 January 2027 zeroes switching charges, not multi-cloud egress.